T. QUINCTIUS FLAMININUS AND THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST PHILIP IN 198 B.C.

A. M. ECKSTEIN

THE CAMPAIGN OF T. Quinctius Flamininus against Philip V of Macedon in 198 B.C. was a turning point in Roman relations with the Greek world; it established a serious Roman military presence in Northern and Central Greece for the first time. That campaign is the major subject of this paper. Before discussing Flamininus' activity in Greece, however, it is worthwhile to comment briefly on modern conceptions of his military and political career before his consulship in 198—which I believe need some revision. It is also important to take a brief look at the strategy which P. Sulpicius Galba (cos. II in 200 B.C.) had been carrying out against Philip in 200 and 199. This subject provides us a means to compare Flamininus' actions and attitudes toward Philip and the Greeks with those of a Roman general who is usually considered to be a more traditional type, i.e., less interested in diplomacy than Flamininus, more interested in simple warfare.

I. T. QUINCTIUS FLAMININUS

Family position was, of course, the essential background for a political career in the Middle Republic. The fortunes of the family of T. Flamininus have been variously evaluated, but it seems fairly clear now, thanks to the recent work of E. Badian, that Flamininus was not a failed patrician of the type of, say, Sulla the Dictator.[1] His family had not held high office for some time. Still, it could probably show a direct ancestor in the

[1]Münzer, *RA* 114 ff., emphasizes the decline of the Quinctii; Badian, "Career," separates the Flaminini from the clan as a whole.

The following special abbreviations are used: Aymard = A. Aymard, *Les premiers rapports de Rome et de la Confédération Achaienne (198–189 avant J.-C.)* (Bordeaux 1938). Badian, "Career" = E. Badian, "The Family and Early Career of T. Quinctius Flamininus," *JRS* 61 (1971) 102–111; Badian, "Philhellenism" = E. Badian, "Titus Quinctius Flamininus: Philhellenism and *Realpolitik*," *University of Cincinatti Classical Studies* 2 (Cincinnati 1973) 273–297; Balsdon = J. P. V. D. Balsdon, "T. Quinctius Flamininus," *Phoenix* 21 (1967) 180–187; Briscoe, *Commentary* = J. Briscoe, *A Commentary on Livy, Books* XXXI–XXXIII (Oxford 1973); Gundel = H. Gundel, "Quinctius" no. 45, *RE* 24 (1963) 1047–1100; Hammond, *JRS* = N. G. L. Hammond, "The Opening Campaigns and the Battle of the Aoi Stena in the Second Macedonian War," *JRS* 56 (1966) 39–54. Münzer, *RA* = F. Münzer, *Römische Adelsparteien und Adelsfamilien* (Stuttgart 1920; 1963); Scullard, *RP* = H. H. Scullard, *Roman Politics 220–150 B.C.*[2] (Oxford 1973); Stier = H. E. Stier, *Roms Aufsteig zur Weltmacht* (Cologne 1957); Walbank = F. W. Walbank, *Philip V of Macedon* (Cambridge 1940).

consulate as recently as 271, and Flamininus' *cognomen* proclaimed new honors won in the same period.[2] Nearer in time, in 217 a relative of Flamininus was one of two men entrusted by the urban praetor with the building of the Temple of Concord (Livy 22.33.8), while in 213 his brother Lucius was adlected to the augurate at an unusually early age (Livy 25.2.2; cf. 43.11.13).[3] One may add that the elaborate aedileship of Lucius with L. Valerius Flaccus in 201 (Livy 31.4.5) suggests substantial family wealth, and that the well-known link of T. Flamininus with the Fabii Buteones[4] suggests substantial family prestige. Therefore, T. Flamininus was not an "outsider" who rose to the consulate by pure merit;[5] rather, he was a man from one of the families more or less at the heart of the *nobilitas*. High office was his by right.

Flamininus' early career was unusual. Rather than advancing through the traditional offices, he reached the consulate in two or three great leaps. He was a military tribune under the great M. Claudius Marcellus in 208 (Plut. *Flam.* 1.3–4, cf. Gundel 1049). At some later time, he was elected quaestor, but Flamininus' quaestorship was so inconspicuous that Livy only mentions it in relation to his consular candidacy in 199, when his quaestorian status became an issue (Livy 32.7.9); therefore, even its date is controversial.[6] Yet Flamininus is next attested in command *pro praetore* of the Roman garrison at Tarentum in 205 and 204 (Livy

[2]Badian, "Career" 105 ff.; H. Gundel, "Quinctius" no. 42, *RE* 24 (1963) 1039.

[3]Badian, "Career" 105–106, 111.

[4]The Q. Fabius Buteo who served under Flamininus in Greece is described as his wife's nephew (Pol. 18.10.8—*αὐτῷ τῆς γυναικὸς ἀδελφιδοῦς*. There is a chance that this means Flamininus' wife was herself a Fabia (cf. Badian, "Philhellenism" 32–33). Livy, however, makes Buteo the son of Flamininus' wife's *sister* (. . . *uxoris sororis filius*), which would mean that Flamininus' relationship to the Buteones was somewhat more distant (Livy 32.36.10; cf. Balsdon 181, n. 19)—but Livy may be guessing in his translation of the Polybian phrase (Badian, "Philhellenism" 32–33 and note 25). In either case, there would still be some link with the Buteones, as Badian points out, and they were fairly prominent—M. Fabius M. f. M. n. Buteo (cos. 245, cens. 241) seems to have headed the war embassy to Carthage in the spring of 218 (Dio fr. 55.10; Zon. 8.22; cf. G. V. Sumner, "The Chronology of the Outbreak of the Second Punic War," *PACA* 9 (1966) 23, n. 62; 24, n. 63) and was *princeps senatus* from 214 through 210, and possibly from 220 through 210, cf. *MRR* 1.259. (The above article by E. Badian receives much criticism in the present paper, but it was a ground-breaking effort and I owe very much to it; my criticism generally takes the form that Prof. Badian has not pursued his own thought far enough.)

[5]Münzer, *RA* 116–118, depicts Flamininus as a bright young man from a failed family, in need of a patron (in this case, M. Claudius Marcellus)—unnecessary if one follows Badian.

[6]*MRR* 1.328, Gundel 1051, and Briscoe, *Commentary* 180 all would place the quaestorship in 199. Badian, "Career" 109, would place the quaestorship in 205 at Tarentum. The case for a date *later* than Flamininus' command *pro praetore* certainly seems weakened by Badian's argument that a man who had already held such a command would be unlikely to step back and run for the quaestorship afterwards.

29.13.6, where he is prorogued for 204), a command of most unusual responsibility for a relatively undistinguished ex-quaestor (if he was, in fact, already of that status). Flamininus is then lost to our sight for three years,[7] but Livy records him as last man on a decemviral commission settling Scipionic veterans in Southern Italy in 201 (Livy 31.4.1–3; cf. 31.49.5). In 200, while still serving on this commission, Flamininus is recorded also on a triumviral commission to fill up the enrollment of settlers at the colony of Venusia (Livy 31.49.6)—another anomaly, for Flamininus is the only Roman known to have held simultaneous positions on two separate land commissions (Badian, "Career" 110; cf. Gundel 1050). Then, in 199, Flamininus decided to seek the consulship for the next year. The Senate overrode tribunician opposition to him, and he was elected by the People (Livy 32.7.8 ff.)—a third anomalous political success.

Clearly, T. Quinctius Flamininus owed his sudden successes to powerful political backing.[8] Polybius refers explicitly to Flamininus' reliance on his political friends in the winter of 198/197 (Pol. 18.10.7; cf. Plut. *Flam.* 7.2). Similarly, the earlier command *pro praetore* at Tarentum, the two land commission offices, the very decision to run for the consulate at an unusually early age,[9] and the action of the Senate against the intervening tribunes all suggest a noble with many political connections. However, since the quick elevation of relatively junior men to high posts was not so unusual in this period,[10] there is no need to assume that Flamininus' political support—though substantial—was particularly overwhelming. In this respect, it is worth remark that the actual delineation of his support continues to elude modern scholarship.[11]

[7]Badian, "Career" 109, argues that Livy's silence concerning Tarentum after 204 is best accounted for by assuming that Flamininus was prorogued in the command, possibly even through 202. But Livy is very careless about events at Tarentum, as Badian points out (*ibid.*), and fails to report the very change in command there which put Flamininus in charge in the first place. He could just as easily have failed to report another change.

[8]Cf. Badian, "Career" 109–110; "Philhellenism" 29–35.

[9]Badian, "Philhellenism" 30.

[10]Cf. Badian, "Career" 110 and n. 45, adducing the examples of L. Cornelius Lentulus, P. Scipio, and P. Sulpicius Galba (on the problems involved in Lentulus' command, however, cf. G. V. Sumner, "Proconsuls and *Provinciae* in Spain, 218/17–196/5 B.C.," *Arethusa* 3 [1970] 89 ff.). Note that the tribunes of 198 complained about this very process (Livy 32.7.8 ff.; cf. Briscoe, *Commentary* 180).

[11]The link between Flamininus and the Fabii Buteones (cf. above, n. 4) should not be used to push Flamininus into a broader "Fabian" group (Münzer, *RA* 117–118; Scullard, *RP* 98; *contra* (rightly), Balsdon 181, n. 19; Briscoe, *Commentary* 30). And the Buteones seem to have suffered some decline in influence following the death of M. Buteo the *princeps senatus*; in Flamininus' generation they do not produce any consuls (although they do have two praetors: M. Buteo, pr. 201—*MRR* 1.319—and Q. Buteo, Flamininus' relative, pr. 196—*MRR* 1.335). In looking for Flamininus' early supporters, one cannot

Some scholars go further than general discussion of Flamininus' political connections, and seek the explanation of his rapid success specifically in his command of the Roman garrison of Tarentum early on. In a brief statement, Plutarch implies that Flamininus handled both the garrison and the contentious civilian (i.e., Greek) population of the city well (*Flam.* 1.4). Moreover, at Tarentum Flamininus will have gained if not "seine aufrichtige Hinneigung zum Griechentum,"[12] at least valuable experience of the Greek language and culture.[13] Having done well there, he was pushed ahead (the land commissions). And when P. Galba failed to bring the war with Philip of Macedon to a victorious end through purely military means, Flamininus then became "the logical candidate" for the Eastern command[14] because of his diplomatic expertise: "there was a job to be done in the East and it looks as if the Senate was now agreed on the man who was to do it."[15] Thus, the Senate united in blocking tribunician opposition to Flamininus' candidacy. After his subsequent election, the sortition of consular provinces also looks suspiciously apt: Flamininus, the man with military experience and success in dealing with the Greeks, received Macedonia, while his colleague Sex. Aelius Paetus—who had neither qualification, as far as we know—received Gaul. Surely, then, this sortition was carefully "managed." One may compare the equally "lucky" sortition of consular provinces for 200, when P. Galba, a general experienced in Greek affairs because of command in the first war with Philip, received Macedonia, while his inexperienced colleague C. Aurelius Cotta received Gaul.[16]

---

put much stress either on his *legati* in Greece, for, of the families there represented, only the Claudii Nerones had the type of senior consulars who presumably were influential in advancing Flamininus' candidacy (cf. the list in Scullard, *RP* 280). Beyond this is uncertainty. P. Scipio can be shown not to have been a violent opponent (the best argument is in Scullard, *RP* 99, n. 1), but this is far from proving him one of Flamininus' major backers. No ancient testimony backs up Badian's thesis that P. Sulpicius Galba supported Flamininus in 199 ("Philhellenism" 34–35).

[12]B. Niese, *Geschichte der griechischen und makedonischen Staaten* 2 (Gotha 1899) 609.

[13]Badian, "Philhellenism" 29.

[14]T. Frank, *A History of Rome* (New York 1923) 140.

[15]Badian, "Career" 110. Cf. the variations of J. Briscoe, "Flamininus and Roman Politics, 200–189 B.C.," *Latomus* 31 (1972) 42—who believes that Flamininus actually campaigned for the consulate on a platform of *eleutheria* for the Greeks (reiterated in *Commentary* 32–33), and of Stier 121—who believes that the Senate turned to Flamininus as the man for the job in Greece when it received Villius' report of the mutiny of the Roman army there (cf. Livy 32.3.2 ff.).

[16]Badian, "Philhellenism" 30–32, who advances discussion by pointing out that this view must be explicitly defended. On Galba, cf. Scullard, *RP* 93; A. H. McDonald and F. W. Walbank, "The Origins of the Second Macedonian War," *JRS* 27 (1937) 207; Scullard, *RP* 97 ff., and Stier 121 assume (with no discussion) that Flamininus was *appointed* to the Macedonian command by the Senate.

This is a thesis well on its way to becoming orthodoxy.[17] Yet it seems to me that we are on uncertain ground here. For what it is worth, Plutarch—whose brief description of Flamininus at Tarentum is the basis for the modern thinking done along this line—himself attributes Flamininus' decision to seek the consulate at an early age *not* to the influence of the Tarentum command, but to his land commission work, and remarks the support of the newly settled voters for him (*Flam.* 1.4 end-2.1).[18] We know from Livy also that Flamininus was heavily involved in land distribution in the years before his candidacy (Livy 31.4.1–3; 49.5; 49.6). It is true that had Flamininus shown gross incompetence at Tarentum his career might have been seriously compromised, and obviously this did not happen. But to conclude that Flamininus not only "apparently distinguished himself"[19] at Tarentum, but that his experience there played a decisive role both in his decision to seek the consulate in 199, and in his eventual success, seems to me to stretch our evidence too far. This is true not only because Plutarch's own comments oppose the above idea; one should note also that according to Livy Flamininus faced opposition in 199 precisely because he was *not* a figure of proven worth (Livy 32.7.8–10).

In fact, despite the military situation at the time—Philip was undefeated in Macedonia (Livy 31.33 ff.), and the Insubres had just cut to pieces a rashly led Roman army in the Cisalpina (Livy 32.7.5–6)—the elections for 198 resulted in two consuls with limited military reputations. Sex. Aelius Paetus had never held an important military command, did not have (as far as we know) any experience with the Greeks, and was, in fact, running directly for the consulate from a magnificent aedileship the year before, in 200 (Livy 31.50.1–2).[20] And it is a fair conjecture that

[17]It has long had a place in the *OCD*, in the variation of A. H. McDonald—Flamininus gained the consulate because of "his philhellenism and diplomatic address" (*OCD*, *OCD*[2] *s.n.*).

[18]There are, of course, several mistakes of fact in this passage (cf. A. Klotz, "Die Quellen Plutarchs in der Lebensbeschreibung des T. Quinctius Flamininus," *RhM* 85 [1935] 49; R. E. Smith, "Plutarch's Biographical Sources in Roman Lives," *CQ* 34 [1940] 2–3). Klotz argues that this section of the *Flamininus* derives ultimately from Valerius Antias, Smith that it derives ultimately from a biographer who had access to family records, including funeral *laudationes*, but who was none too careful about checking details. However, the importance of the land commission appointments is recognized by Badian, "Philhellenism" 29–30 and "Career" 110—but he also assigns great influence to Flamininus' Tarentum experience.

[19]Badian, "Philhellenism" 29.

[20]Cf. *RE* 1 *s.v.* "Aelius" no. 105 for an outline of the career of Sex. Paetus. T. A. Dorey, "Scipio Africanus as a Party Leader," *Klio* 39 (1961) 192–193, emphasizes Paetus' lack of military qualifications. Both Sex. Paetus and his elder brother P. Paetus (cos. 201) were distinguished jurists (cf. U. Schlag, *Regnum in Senatu: Das Wirken römischer Staatsmänner von 200 bis 191 v. Chr.* [Stuttgart 1968] 145–147).

Paetus owed his success simply to powerful political support—his brother had just won the censorship (Livy 32.7.2).[21] But in 199 Flamininus was hardly a much more outstanding candidate. Even the militarily inexperienced Paetus was probably six or seven years older,[22] and in 199 all Flamininus had to his credit (as far as we can tell) was a couple of years of garrison duty in a ruined city[23] in the South of Italy. This would not have allowed him to be called an expert on the Greek situation (or the Gallic), or an important general—and, indeed, we know that some men considered Flamininus unqualified. Rather, Flamininus is not unlike Sex. Paetus: a well-connected, relatively inexperienced man, who owed his early consulship to his own ambition, to powerful friends—and possibly to a dearth of competition for the consulate in this year.[24]

If this conception of the consular elections for 198 is accepted, we need no longer believe that the sortition of consular provinces for 198 was also "managed" so that Flamininus received Macedonia, for he will not have been that much more experienced than the equally successful and somewhat older Sex. Paetus. Beyond this, Livy reports that the new consuls in fact *rejected* a managed division of their provinces; the Senate allowed them to arrange the division between themselves (Livy 32.8.1), but they chose to accept a sortition instead (Livy 32.8.4). In view of their rejection of a *comparatio*, it seems hard to deny the honesty of the sortition.[25]

[21]Beyond their other connections, P. and Sex. Paetus seem to have enjoyed the favor of L. Cornelius Lentulus, the consul presiding at the elections for 198: note that he appointed both of them to the commission investigating conditions at Narnia just before the elections, along with his own brother Cn. Lentulus, cos. 201 (Livy 32.2.6–7). Such an expression of confidence by the presiding consul seems to have paid off for the Paeti—and note that P. Paetus, as cos. 201, did not block the attempt of Cn. Lentulus to force the Senate to give him the African command (Livy 30.40.7–8). This did not prevent P. Paetus from working with P. Scipio in their censorship (Livy 32.7.3); the Paeti were an independent force (cf. Dorey [above, n. 20] 192–194).

[22]T. Flamininus was born about 229/228—cf. Pol. 18.12.5 ("not over 30" at the time of the Nicaea conference), and Plut. *Flam.* 2.2 ("not yet 30" when elected consul). Sex. Paetus was probably born by 235—cf. G. V. Sumner, *The Orators in Cicero's Brutus: Prosopography and Chronology* (Toronto 1973) 37.

[23]Cf. P. Wuilleumier, *Tarente, des origines à la conquête romaine* (Paris 1939) 162–163. The spoils taken from Tarentum after the troops of Q. Fabius Maximus thoroughly sacked it in 209 (including 30,000 slaves) were said almost to equal the booty of Syracuse (Livy 27.16). The Romans dealt harshly with the city after the war (*ibid.* 167–168).

[24]Scullard remarks that Flamininus' prospects "must have been helped by the marked absence of outstanding *praetorii*" available for the consulate in 199 (*RP* 97); the same holds true for Sex. Paetus, 96. Cf. the prosopographical analysis of available ex-praetors, 282–283.

[25]Badian, "Philhellenism" 31–32, argues that after an open and honest division of provinces was rejected, the sortition was then secretly faked—for reasons of religious propaganda and morale. This devious procedure would have been somewhat self-defeating if everyone knew Flamininus was obviously much more qualified to face Philip in the first place, and if this "lucky" sortition was part of a continuing pattern, as most scholars believe.

In fact, generally one should be cautious about the thesis that sortition was being consistently faked in this period so that experienced officers were sent to areas of danger. Of the two examples of ancient Roman suspicion of the honesty of the lot which are adduced by L. R. Taylor, both are from the Ciceronian age, 150 years later.[26] And, in Flamininus' time, inexperienced men had no trouble gaining great commands by the lot. The outcome of the lottery the year before Flamininus' own election resulted in P. Villius Tappulus, a man with little military reputation,[27] receiving the Macedonian command over the very experienced L. Lentulus (Livy 32.1.1–3). The inexperienced Villius fully intended to have his campaign against Philip (cf. Livy 32.6.3, where he is depicted planning his summer fighting); this hardly looks like a "lucky" lottery outcome for the Roman People. Also striking is the sortition for 191: M.' Acilius Glabrio, a man with little experience in high command,[28] received the war against Antiochus (Livy 36.2.2); his colleague P. Cornelius Scipio Nasica—not only a proven general (cf. Livy 35.1.3 ff.), but the very man who had carried the war motion in the *comitia* (Livy 36.1.6)—received Gaul.[29] These cases bring in question the original "suspicious" sortition for the second war against Philip. Then the great command fell to the experienced general (P. Galba—Livy 31.6.1), the man who—like Scipio Nasica—carried the war motion in the assembly (Livy 31.7.1 ff.). Yet the experienced Scipio Nasica wound up fighting on the Po (Livy 36.38.5 ff.). This raises at least the possibility that Galba's second command in Greece was really a coincidence. The lot was hedged about with ceremony and religious feeling—the augurs guarded the choice of the gods.[30]

My conclusion is that both consuls for 198 owed their early consulships to their own ambitions and political connections, not to their intrinsic and acknowledged military and diplomatic expertise. If one accepts this view, a rather different picture of T. Quinctius Flamininus emerges: not a philhellene with diplomatic and military experience elected in 199

[26]Cic. *Planc.* 35; *Leg. agr.* 2.21—L. R. Taylor, *Roman Voting Assemblies* (Ann Arbor, Mich. 1966) 73 and n. 29.

[27]Villius, as pr. 203 (prorogued for 202), had commanded a squadron of ships off the coast of Sicily (Livy 30.2.2; 27.8; 41.6). His orders were defensive (Livy 30.27.8), and he is not known to have engaged any Punic raiders.

[28]Praetor peregrinus five years previously (*MRR* 1.335); he put down a slave revolt (Livy 33.36.2–3).

[29]Any problems with Glabrio's inexperience may have been eased by the four consular *legati* he took over with him to Greece (*MRR* 1.355).

[30]Taylor (above, n. 26) 72–74 (on the role of the augurs, 73–74: the lottery pitcher seems to have been one of the symbols of their priesthood). One might also note that since every candidate for consul had had ten years military training even if he had never held high command (Pol. 6.19.5), the differences in proven ability which are clear to us might have been less clear to the Romans. This would be all the more reason for the lot not to be "managed."

specifically to deal with Philip,[31] but rather a young man with few special qualifications (at least, as far as the surviving evidence allows us to judge) who owed his election to internal politics, and his opportunity in Greece to luck (the lot).

II. THE STRATEGY OF P. GALBA, 200–199

In the First Macedonian War, P. Sulpicius Galba had been one of those most responsible for the policy of terrorism which the Romans had pursued against the Greek allies of Philip. His term of command had begun with the sack of Aegina (Pol. 9.42.5–8; cf. 11.5.6–8), and had ended with the sack of Dyme in Achaea (Paus. 7.17.5; Livy 32.22.10; App. *Mac.* 7). As a result, he was unpopular with many Greeks (cf. the scene at App. *Mac.* 3), and violently unpopular in Achaea (App. *Mac.* 7). If the envoys of the Senate in early 200 had sought to soften the bad impression made by Rome in the First Macedonian War,[32] the widely-proclaimed new Roman concern for the Greeks was going to be put to a severe test in the type of strategy adopted by Galba in his new command in late 200 and 199.

In the event, Galba and his legates adopted a strategy of bringing Philip to decisive battle while plundering his Greek allies. Incidents of Roman brutality abounded in the fighting of 200 and 199,[33] and the "new image" proclaimed by the Roman envoys before the war—to which the Greeks had at best adopted an unenthusiastic and "wait-and-see" attitude—came crashing down.[34] The Romans' "savage treatment of ancient Greek cities which had done the Romans no harm and were subject to Macedon against their will" (Paus. 7.8.2) continued to dominate the Greek perception of the Republic.

But this does not mean that Galba ignored diplomacy as a weapon against Philip. We know that in the winter of 200/199, and again in the spring of 199, he made two unsuccessful attempts to bring the Aetolian League into the war (Livy 31.28.3; 31.29–33). He also established important diplomatic contacts with Amynander of Athamania, and with two Eastern Adriatic chieftains, Pleuratus of the Illyrii and Bato of the Dardani (Livy 31.28.2—fall, 200).

In fact, it has been argued (Walbank 141) that Galba's grand strategic design for 199 was *based* on diplomacy; he hoped to launch a triple in-

[31]*OCD*[2] s.v. "Flamininus" no. 1. Cf. Scullard, *RP* 100–101.

[32]Cf. M. Holleaux, *Rome, la Grèce et les monarchies hellénistiques au IIIe siècle avant J.-C. (273–205)* (Paris 1935) 231 ff.

[33]The destruction of Chalcis (Livy 31.23.6 ff.), Antipatreia (Livy 31.27.1–6), Andros (Livy 31.45.1–8), Acanthus (Livy 31.45.16); the selling of the entire population of Oreus into slavery (Livy 31.46.9 ff.).

[34]Cf. Badian, "Philhellenism" 35–38.

vasion of Macedon that summer, so large and from so many directions that Philip would be overwhelmed: the Adriatic tribes from the northwest, the Romans from the west, Amynander and the Aetolians from the southwest (through Thessaly). This plan miscarried, however. The Aetolians remained neutral (despite two diplomatic initiatives by the Romans), and the raids of the Illyrians were uncoordinated with Galba's own attempt to bring Philip's main force to battle in W. Macedonia. The latter was a tough and frustrating mountain campaign (Livy 31.33 ff.), and, while not completely futile (Hammond, *JRS* 45), it broke the morale of Galba's army (Livy 32.3.2). The Aetolian League finally did enter the war that summer (under the mistaken impression that Philip had already been beaten—Livy 31.40.7–10); but, operating independently of both the Romans and the Illyrians, the League forces were badly defeated by Philip (Livy 31.41.7—42.9).

Thus, if Galba's failure in 199 was in part a diplomatic as well as military one (the Aetolians were not persuaded to fight until they were too late to be effective), it is still quite clear that Galba understood the value of diplomatic overtures to neutral states in the area of operations he thought vital to his campaign. It is also clear that Galba did not see such diplomatic overtures as inconsistent with the occasional butchery of communities which, willingly or not, continued to adhere to the cause of Philip. It is against the background of this strategy that one must see the actions of T. Quinctius Flamininus in 198.

III. THE CAMPAIGN OF 198

Philip prepared for the fighting season of 198 by occupying the narrows of the Aous River Gorge (the "Aoi Stena") in Northern Epirus (Livy 32.5.9 ff.). From this seemingly impregnable position (cf. Livy 32.5.10–13), he faced the Romans with a choice: either to advance into Macedon along the route pioneered by Galba in 199, while Philip remained on their southern flank, ready to cut them off from their supply bases on the Adriatic coast (and supplies had been a major problem for Galba—Livy 31.33.4; 33.6; 36.5–7; 39.3–4; cf. Plut. *Flam.* 3.1), or else to spend the summer trying to pry him out of the Gorge (Hammond, *JRS* 45).

A. Flamininus Supersedes Villius

At the beginning of the spring of 198, the Epirote chieftain Charops informed the new Roman commander against Philip—P. Villius Tappulus (cos. 199)—that the King had occupied the Aous Gorge. Villius had suppressed the mutiny in Galba's army when he took it over, using tact and firmness (Livy 32.3.2 ff., esp. 6–7). Now he marched up the Aous to face Philip (Livy 32.6.3). But while at the Aoi Stena, he learned that

T. Flamininus, the new consul, had crossed to Corcyra and was ready to assume command (Livy 32.6.4).

At Livy 32.6.3, Villius is depicted considering whether to fight Philip in the Aoi Stena or to invade Macedon along the Galba route. This certainly implies that Villius thought he would have the campaigning season of 198 for his own operations against Philip. In this situation, it is rather hard to believe that Flamininus' supersession of him did not come as a nasty surprise.[35]

Villius' supersession by Flamininus before his chance to campaign did not prevent him later from agreeing with both Flamininus and Galba on the generally tough form Roman policy in the East should take.[36] This need not imply anything about Villius' attitude toward Flamininus in 198.[37] In fact, the heavy criticism of the generalship of Villius (and Galba) in 199 and 198 in Plutarch's biography of Flamininus (*Flam.* 3.1–2) might suggest there had been some sort of clash (cf. the implicit criticism of Villius at the Gorge—*Flam.* 3.4). But, if so, Villius' ruffled dignity may have later been soothed by his commission as a special adviser to Flamininus (Livy 32.28.12)—or it may be that consideration of political realities in the East led Villius to believe (with Flamininus) that a tough Roman policy was simply the correct one. As for Flamininus, he was clearly anxious to take responsibility for the war himself; this fits with his ambition to run for the consulate early.

B. The "Aous Declaration"

Flamininus spent the first 40 days of his new command considering whether to try to force the Aoi Stena or to invade Macedon along the Galba route (Livy 32.9.8–11; cf. Plut. *Flam.* 4.1)—the same problem with which Villius had wrestled. He came to no more imaginative solution than Villius; but during this period there seems to have been no fighting (Livy 32.10.1 with Briscoe, *Commentary* 185). This period of *de facto* truce (an extension of Villius' inactivity) encouraged Philip to try to make peace; a meeting with Flamininus was arranged through the neutral Epi-

[35]Livy's story that Villius learned simultaneously *both* of Flamininus' election as consul and of his arrival at Corcyra (32.6.4) may be mere dramatics (cf. Badian, "Philhellenism" 38, n. 44); if so, it is instructive that Villius did not expect to be immediately superseded, even though he knew Flamininus had been elected consul.

[36]Schlag (above, n. 20) 100–110 attempts to present Villius and Flamininus as "doves" concerning the problem of Antiochus III, and consequently hostile to Galba, who is presented as a "hawk." Since, on Schlag's reconstruction, Flamininus may have provoked the Senate against Antiochus merely in order to maintain his own command in Greece (cf. 89–90; 92–93—but ignoring the possibility of some annalistic contamination), while Villius cooperated with Galba in looking for a *causa belli* at Antiochus' court in 193 (Livy 35.13–17), this seems unconvincing; cf. Balsdon 185–187.

[37]*Contra*, Badian, "Philhellenism" 37–38 and n. 44.

rotes. The result of this conference was Flamininus' famous series of demands on Philip known collectively to modern scholarship as the "Aous Declaration."

This was a far more harsh position than that taken by the Roman envoys of early 200. Then Philip had been told to refrain from aggression against Greek states independent of Macedon if he wished to remain at peace with Rome. Now he was told that he must withdraw his garrisons from the Greek states already under his control—starting with Thessaly, which had been Macedonian for 150 years—if he wished to obtain peace from the Republic (Livy 32.10.3–9).

The "Aous Declaration" was partially for Greek consumption; this is indicated by the fact that the Greek allies of Rome made its terms their basic condition for peace at the Nicaea conference later in 198 (Pol. 18.2.6; 9.1; cf. Livy 32.35.12). But it may be a serious misconception to overemphasize the role of the Greeks here. The demand that Philip withdraw his forces from all his Greek dependencies was aimed more at *Philip* than at the Greeks. The problem at the Aous conference was the still unsettled role of Philip *vis-à-vis* Rome—that is, the establishment of Rome as his acknowledged superior. Indeed, it was just this problem of his political status, the Roman refusal to leave him a shred of dignity (despite the fact that he had fought them to a standstill and seriously defeated their allies—or perhaps because of it), which led Philip to break off negotiations (Livy 32.10.7–8).

How were Flamininus' terms for the Aous conference decided? In Diodorus' account, when Philip protests the demand to withdraw from all of Greece, Flamininus replies that "he had orders from the senate to free not a part of Greece, but all of it" (Diod. 28.11). On the basis of this passage, most scholars have assumed that all of Flamininus' terms on the Aous were the direct product of senatorial instructions.[38]

One must assume that Flamininus had orders from the senate to the effect that he should "free Greece" (although one may wonder why any reference to them is missing from Livy's account of the conference, which, like Diodorus' account, derives from Polybius[39]). However, the negotiating position which Flamininus allowed Philip to submit to the senate after the Nicaea conference was, of course, somewhat *short* of the peace terms he demanded from Philip on the Aous earlier in the

[38]M. Holleaux, *CAH* 8.168–169; T. Frank, *Roman Imperialism* (New York 1914) 161, n. 29; Aymard 2; Walbank 152, n. 1; Stier 121; Badian, "Philhellenism" 36–38.

[39]On Livy's use of Polybius, cf. now W. Flurl, *Deditio in Fidem: Untersuchungen zu Livius und Polybios* (1969), 26 ff. (somewhat overdone concerning the changes Livy seems to introduce); on Diodorus' use of Polybius, cf. H. Nissen, *Kritische Untersuchungen über die Quellen der vierten und fünften Dekade des Livius* (Berlin 1863) 110–112. The precision with which Diodoros has reproduced the original Polybian account of the Aous conference has, however, recently come into doubt; cf. Briscoe, *Commentary* 186.

year. The Nicaea proposal, as it stood, left a good part of Thessaly still in Philip's hands, and it looks as if the Macedonian evacuation of the fortresses at the Acrocorinth, Chalcis, and Demetrias was not even included in it as an issue to be decided by negotiation with the senate (cf. Pol. 18.11; Livy 32.37.1–5; some points in dispute were put in that category—Pol. 18.9.4–5). Moreover, Flamininus supported the idea of submitting Philip's peace terms to the senate partly because "it was to the general advantage to arrive at a knowledge of the will of the senate" here (Pol. 18.9.9; cf. Livy 32.36.6); he was also perfectly prepared to have his political allies advocate this compromise peace before the senate (Pol. 18.10.7; 11.1–2; cf. Livy 32.32.7–8—from Polybius).[40] All this indicates that whatever *general* senatorial directive Flamininus had been given concerning "the freeing of Greece," it did not make the specific, harsh terms he demanded from Philip on the Aous *mandatory*.

If the Aous terms were not mandatory, we return again to the question of their origin. Here it is worth remembering that it was the Epirotes who initiated the movement for an Aous peace conference, not Flamininus (Livy 32.10.1; cf. Diod. 28.11). This lends credence to the idea that while Flamininus at the Aous was working within a senatorial consensus on the war aim of "freeing Greece" from Macedonian domination,[41] the *specific* terms he demanded there (such as the withdrawal from Thessaly) were actually worked out by the consul and his *consilium* as a negotiating position once it became known through the Epirotes that Philip was willing to talk peace. In other words, the Aous terms were a (harsh) interpretation of the general war aim of the senate. The reason for that harshness seems fairly clear. The consul was concerned with *gloria*; the hasty superseding of Villius shows that. If Philip really wanted to make peace on the Aous without further fighting, Flamininus was determined that it would be on terms which made Roman political supremacy over Macedon clear, and which would gain him the honor of having negotiated a peace whose terms went far beyond the actual achievements of Roman arms in the war. If Philip refused his terms, Flamininus was perfectly prepared to fight, and his subsequent actions show that he was confident (even over-confident) of the results (on the other hand, at the later Nicaea conference, Flamininus was prepared to be somewhat more conciliatory, under the pressure to have a peace agreement to support before the senate in case he was not prorogued).

To summarize, I believe it probable that the "Aous Declaration" was

[40]Cf. M. Holleaux, "Les conférences de Lokride et la politique de T. Quinctius Flamininus," *REG* 36 (1923) 115–171; strongly supported by Badian, "Philhellenism" 40 ff., against the criticisms of Balsdon 180 ff.

[41]On the "Aous Declaration" and its relation to the concept of *eleutheria* proposed in 196, cf. E. Badian, *Foreign Clientelae* (Oxford 1958) 71–72.

aimed primarily at Philip, to make him formally acknowledge Roman political supremacy if he really wanted peace, and that Flamininus was not acting here directly on orders from the senate, but rather worked out with his *consilium* a harsh interpretation of the prevailing senatorial consensus when he learned that Philip was ready to negotiate.

C. Flamininus' Turn to the South

The failure of the Aous negotiations led to an unsuccessful attempt by the consul to carry the Aoi Stena position by frontal assault (Livy 32.10.9–12); the *hubris* involved in such a plan may partially account for Flamininus' tough terms to Philip. Eventually, the pro-Roman Epirote Charops provided Flamininus with a shepherd who knew a path around Philip's position (Livy 32.11.1 ff.). This made possible a flanking maneuver, which, carefully coordinated with a second frontal attack on the narrows, resulted in Flamininus' first military victory (Livy 32.12).

Thanks to the consul's cautious pursuit, Philip was able to withdraw his main forces intact up the Aous Valley (Livy 32.12.10; cf. 12.7); he then crossed the mountains into Thessaly (Livy 32.13.1–6). Flamininus did not follow the King very far up-river (Livy 32.13.1), perhaps only as far as "Castra Pyrrhi," one day's march (Hammond, *JRS* 52). Flamininus had previously at least seriously considered an invasion of Macedon along the Galba route (cf. Livy 32.9.8–11), but now, after the Aous victory, he turned south instead, into Epirus (Livy 32.14.4 ff.).

This change of plan needs to be explained. One possibility is that the turn to the south was chiefly a political decision: "What mattered was less the quick defeat of Philip than the winning of Greece."[42] In other words, Flamininus turned south to enter into diplomatic relations with the states of Thessaly and Central Greece rather than immediately seeking a definitive military victory. This hypothesis is supported by the consul's ostentatious refraining from the devastation of Epirus (Livy 32.14.6–7; Plut. *Flam.* 5.1–4); the Epirotes had not officially joined Rome, and many were hostile (Livy 32.14.5), yet Epirus was spared. This seems a radical change from the brutality of a Galba.[43]

However, while it is true that Livy says that most Epirotes supported

[42]Badian, "Philhellenism" 39; cf. (for instance) Stier 125; W. Dahlheim, *Struktur und Entwicklung des römischen Völkerrechts im dritten und zweiten Jahrhundert v. Chr.* (1968) 46.

[43]The above hypothesis would also be supported by Plutarch's account of the later stages of the campaign, which pictures the Thessalians, Phocians, and Achaeans—moved by Flamininus' humanity—flocking voluntarily to the side of Rome (*Flam.* 5.2 ff.). This account, so influential in modern conceptions of Flamininus (cf. Scullard, *RP* 100–101), is contradicted by the lengthy and detailed account of Livy (cf. below, 138–141), which shows that force and fear of force brought over the communities of Central Greece to Flamininus.

Philip, the League was still officially neutral.[44] We have seen that Flamininus' predecessor P. Galba, while he could be brutal to the Greek allies of Philip, handled those neutral states he considered strategically important with diplomacy rather than force (above, 126–127). Flamininus' action, therefore, does not seem so much different from Galba's (although the hostility of the Epirotes could certainly have been used as an excuse to ravage their countryside if he had wished).

Moreover, it is clear that the turning southeast into Epirus did *not* mean the abandonment of an attempt at a military decision in 198, and a concentration instead on the making of diplomatic gains in Greece. Once the way was open for operations in Thessaly, Flamininus crossed over from Epirus; but this simply meant that he had decided to try to approach Pella from the south rather than from the mountains to its west. In fact, Flamininus' summer campaign in Thessaly seems to have been aimed at the most direct route from Epirus to Pella (i.e., Epirus-Phaloria-Atrax—see map on page 137). It was along this route that Philip was able to block him. But that was unexpected: the consul's advance was broken on the fortress of Atrax, in a siege which failed humiliatingly (cf. Livy 32.17.9) after an unexpectedly long duration (Livy 32.17.4). It was *only* then—when the invasion of Macedon had become (unexpectedly) impossible—that Flamininus, in considering possible winter quarters for his troops, turned his attention to Central Greece. Mommsen realized this long ago.[45]

If Flamininus was still seeking a military solution in 198, the aspect of strategy which seems to have been decisive in his decision not to try the route pioneered by Galba was supply. At first glance, the Galba route seems the shortest and easiest route the Romans had into Macedon; it was (more or less) the later *Via Egnatia*.[46] But Galba had not found the mountains of Western Macedon easy going in 199, and both Plutarch and Livy say that it was just the problem of supplies along this route which convinced Flamininus to try something else (Plut. *Flam.* 4.1; Livy 32.9.9–11—in Livy, even a frontal attack on the Aoi Stena position is preferable!)

But why the southeast route? I think it probable that the real basis for Flamininus' turn into Epirus and his eventual invasion of Thessaly was the expected fall of the Macedonian fortress of Gomphi, on the border of Thessaly and Athamania, which opened up a new (southern) supply route for the Romans.

[44]S. I. Oost, *Roman Policy in Epirus and Acarnania in the Age of the Roman Conquest of Greece*, Arnold Foundation Studies, N.S. 4 (Dallas, Texas 1954) 48.

[45]After the failure at Atrax, Flamininus turned towards the Gulf of Corinth ". . . da es doch zu spät war, um dies Jahr noch in Makedonien einzudringen" (*Römische Geschichte* [Berlin 1907] 1.709).

[46]Badian, "Philhellenism" 39.

The news of the Aous victory revitalized the Aetolians and the Athamanes (Livy 32.13.10; 13.15). The Aetolians began to raid Philip's dependents in Thessaly (Livy 32.13.10 ff.). But Amynander of Athamania, with the help of Roman troops already on hand from Flamininus (Livy 32.14.1), seized the Gomphi area and the fortress of Gomphi itself, as he had wished to do in 199 (Livy 31.41.6). The point of the fall of Gomphi for the Romans was that it opened up a new and difficult but very short supply route for Roman operations: Gulf of Ambracia-Athamania-Gomphi-Thessaly (. . . *est iter a Gomphis Ambraciam sicut impeditum ac difficile ita spatio perbrevi* . . .—Livy 32.15.6). In fact, Flamininus counted on being supplied by this route during the Thessalian fighting (Livy 32.15.7), but before Amynander captured the Gomphi fortress, the route was solidly blocked.

It is plain that Flamininus knew about the capture of Gomphi before he went into Thessaly. On his march through Epirus, he ordered the Roman supply ships waiting at Corcyra to proceed to the Gulf of Ambracia (Livy 32.14.7). If Gomphi had still been in Macedonian hands, this order would have been pointless—the supply route from the Gulf of Ambracia to Thessaly would have been blocked.

Flamininus must have seen the possibilities which Gomphi opened up even before the battle on the Aous; for we find some of his troops already helping Amynander with the siege of Gomphi immediately after the battle (Livy 32.14.1). While preparing for the invasion of Thessaly, the consul took good care that supplies were ready to come up the new route (Livy 32.14.7). Once in Thessaly, he was anxious that his orders had been carried out (Livy 32.15.5), for the Romans were already having serious supply problems because of the sparing of Epirus (*ibid.*—. . . *omnia exercitui deessent*; cf. Plut. *Flam.* 5.1). The necessary resupply operation was then carried out—through Gomphi (Livy 32.15.5–6); within a few days, the army was again in good shape (Livy 32.15.7—. . . *repleta omni rerum copia sunt castra*).[47]

[47]It is also possible to doubt the length of time Flamininus actually spent in Epirus before he crossed into Thessaly. The generally accepted opinion is that of J. Kromayer (*Antike Schlachtfelder in Griechenland* [Berlin 1907] 2.107–109), that Flamininus spent a month in diplomacy with the Epirotes. This is based on the idea that the renewed fighting of the Aetolians and Athamanes after the Aous victory, and the news of the results of that fighting to get back to Flamininus, altogether took about a month; this "month" is chronologically coordinated by Livy with Flamininus' stay in Epirus (cf. 32.14.4 ff.—. . . *dum Athamanes Aetolique* etc. . . .). However, Livy only assigns a few days to the siege of Gomphi (32.14.2—*per aliquot dies* . . .), and, since Flamininus was vitally interested in it (cf. above, 132–133), couriers could easily have been on hand to inform him immediately of its fall (Roman troops were available). There is therefore no reason on chronological grounds to suppose that the Roman army must have spent a month in Epirus before hearing this decisive news: it could have been a significantly shorter time. Moreover, according to N. G. L. Hammond, modern Epirus remains the poorest agricultural area in Greece (*Epirus* [Oxford 1967] 19; 22); cereals (the Roman staple) have

If, then, Flamininus' turn to the southeast after the Aous fighting was simply the choosing of an alternative route to get at Pella (or to bring Philip to decisive battle to defend the Plain of Larissa, as finally happened in 197), then the fall of Gomphi was the basis of this whole campaign. It was this which opened up a new southern route to Macedon, previously impossible because of the distance of Thessaly from the original Roman supply ports on the Adriatic.[48] Thus, in the summer of 198, T. Quinctius Flamininus was still concentrating on the military problem, and his action in turning south was predicated on supplies, not on the opportunity for diplomacy with the Greeks. This is consonant with what has been said both about his early career and about the "Aous Declaration," i.e., that Flamininus had no diplomatic mission to the Greeks because of any special expertise, but rather had become consul simply through good connections and extraordinary ambition, and was still pursuing a traditional military mission—the humbling of Philip—by the traditional military means.

D. The Fighting in Thessaly

Flamininus thus descended from Epirus into Thessaly, coming out of the mountains at Phaloria (Livy 32.15.1), a fairly large town[49] as well as a fortress blocking the western approaches to the Upper Peneus Valley. Phaloria was held by a garrison of 2,000 Macedonian soldiers (Livy 32.15.2). The siege lasted some time, and Flamininus pressed it day and night, because, according to Livy, he felt the attitude of the other Thessalian towns depended on whether Phaloria was able to resist (*ibid.*). Finally, the continuous Roman assaults broke down the resistance of the garrison; the town was taken and burnt to the ground, as an object lesson (Livy 32.15.3) to the neighboring communities, which had already surrendered.

---

to be *imported* every year. In the second century, the country was even more wild and rugged than it is now (cf. the extensive ancient forests, *ibid.* 18–19). These conditions could well account for the serious Roman supply problems mentioned by Livy (32.15.5–7) and Plutarch (*Flam.* 5.1), and make it most unlikely that the Drin and Kalamas Valleys and the Plain of Iohannina (the consul's presumed route to the southeast—*ibid.* 619) could have supported the extra burden of Flamininus' army of more than 20,000 men for a month (note that Caesar remarked the *omnium rerum inopiam* on his march through Epirus in 48—until his army took Gomphi [*BCiv* 3.80]). All these considerations suggest, then, that Flamininus did not devote a month to the charming of the Epirotes, but rather that his march through Epirus was more a matter of a couple of weeks (or even less; Philip was anxious to beat him into Thessaly; Livy 32.13.4–5).

[48]That is, the shortest route from the Roman base at Apollonia to Thessaly *via* Epirus was up the Aous Valley, over the Zygos Pass, and down the Upper Peneus Valley to Phaloria, a distance of about 160 Roman miles, through some difficult country; the supply route from the Gulf of Ambracia to Gomphi was about 50 Roman miles long (cf. the map, below, 137).

[49]*RE* 22 s.v. "Phaloria."

The point of the razing of Phaloria was to achieve the quick submission of Western Thessaly: those towns which surrendered voluntarily (such as Metropolis and Cierium—Livy 32.15.3) would be spared (. . . *venia eisdem petentibus datur—ibid.*); those towns which caused trouble to the Roman advance would be, like Phaloria, utterly destroyed (compare the tactics of Cn. Cornelius Scipio on the Spanish coast in 218—Pol. 3.76.2; cf. Livy 21.60.3–4).

The destruction of Phaloria thus tends to show that Flamininus operated with the same ideas as other Roman generals of the period concerning the effectiveness of terrorism in reducing recalcitrant populations to obedience (cf. also the rather harrowing Pol. 10.15.4 on the actions of P. Scipio in Spain). And, in this connection, one might mention the similarity between the destruction of Phaloria by Flamininus in 198 and the destruction of Antipatreia by Galba's legate Apustius in 200 (Livy 31.27.1–6). In both cases the brutal Roman behavior towards the captured town had the same point: the submission of neighboring communities (although desire for booty was also involved at Antipatreia—Livy 31.27.6).

The sack of Phaloria also tends to show that Flamininus was not pursuing any new lenient policy towards Philip's Greek allies (or "hostile" neutrals like Epirus) because of principles inherent in the "Aous Declaration", but rather that the sparing of Epirus was an *ad hoc* action—as the ancient sources say.[50]

The immediate military effect of Phaloria was positive: Western Thessaly quickly submitted (as had, for instance, the town of Codrio to Apustius when faced with the example of Antipatreia in 200—Livy 31.27.5). After resupply achieved through the Ambracia-Gomphi route, Flamininus was able to turn towards Larissa and Tempe with a passive population to his rear. Diplomatically, the effect may have been somewhat different. Balanced with Phaloria must be the plundering of Eretria on Euboea by the consul's brother L. Flamininus about this time (Livy 32.16.15–17), and the probable sack of Carystus also.[51] These events will have increased the fear of the Flaminini among the Greeks, and fear can be a useful diplomatic weapon; but they lay to rest the idea that T. Flamininus was the bearer of any new Roman policy towards the Greeks. By the fall of 198, Pausanias says (7.8.1), the Flamininus brothers were highly unpopular in Achaea because of the atrocities they had committed—just like Galba (App. *Mac.* 7).

[50]Plutarch reports that Flamininus prevented his army from plundering Epirus in order to create a good impression when compared with Philip's "scorched earth" policy in Thessaly (*Flam.* 5.1); Livy's reason is that the Epirotes simply did not oppose the Roman advance (32.14.6).

[51]The population of Carystus fled from the town proper into the citadel at the approach of the fleet (Livy 32.17.1). One may well imagine what happened when the troops entered the abandoned town.

There may even have been a militarily negative effect to the razing of Phaloria: in that place in Thessaly where there was resistance, it was fierce. Flamininus found that at the fortress of Atrax—the gateway from Western Thessaly to the Plain of Larissa—the garrison was prepared to fight desperately. The consul was surprised at the determination of the resistance at Atrax (Livy 32.17.4), but, having committed himself to the Thessalian route to Macedon, he had to take it. Again, supply may have been the decisive factor. Philip and the Aetolians had combined to create a desert of the Enipeus Valley (Thessaliotis); Atrax therefore blocked the only route available to Flamininus from Phaloria to Larissa—he could not go around (see map on page 137). Pride was another factor. Flamininus realized that once the siege of Atrax had begun, to give it up as hopeless would have involved a great loss to Roman prestige (Livy 32.17.9; cf. 18.1). We do not know the length of the siege, but it was fairly long (Kromayer [above, note 47] 109 suggests between one and two months). The siege went on for so long, and eventually seemed so hopeless (Livy 32.18.1), that Flamininus was forced to begin thinking about winter quarters for his troops (Livy 32.18.2).

E. Phocis

Livy reports that there was no way for the consul to winter his troops in Thessaly itself, because it was far from the sea, and the region had been devastated during the summer (Livy 32.18.2).[52] It may be important for our conception of the development of his policy towards the Greek allies of Philip that Livy indicates Flamininus would have preferred to winter in Thessaly, ignoring the states of Central Greece altogether. But this was not possible; Flamininus was logistically dependent on the sea (Livy 32.18.2–3), and would have to winter by it. This left a choice between the Adriatic coast and the Gulf of Corinth (most of the Aegean coast of Greece was out of the question because the sea-route around Cape Malia was impracticable in winter).

However, no harbor on the coast of Aetolia or Acarnania was deemed large enough to accommodate both the army and its attendant supply fleet throughout the winter (Livy 32.18.3). Anticyra in Phocis was chosen instead. Livy thus makes it clear that considerations of supply—not diplomacy—once again determined the course of Flamininus' campaign.

The Romans came south through Thermopylae, and set about the conquest of Phocis (Livy 32.18.6–9). The month's campaign (Walbank

[52]This may again point up the importance of the Gomphi route to Flamininus. The area becomes heavily snowed-in in winter (cf. Hammond [above, n. 47] 17). This would make the supply of an army wintering in Thessaly by means of a fleet stationed in the Gulf of Ambracia impossible; the Athamanian route was difficult enough in summer (Livy 32.15.6).


CHALCIDICE
Pella
Pydna
Larissa
Halicmon R.
Aeas R.
THESSALY
Enipeus R.
Cierium
Metropolis
Gomphi
Peneus R.
Phaloria
Dodona
Arachthus R.
Ambracia
ATHAMANIA
Inachus R.
AETOLIA
ACARNANIA
Leucas
Oreum
EUBOEA
Chalcis
Eretria
Thebes
Athens
Elateia
Daulis
PHOCIS
Anticyra
Corinth
ACHAEA
Dyme
Aous R.
Antigonea
Apsus R.
Aoi Stena
Castra Pyrrhi
Aous R.
EPIRUS
Phoenice
CORCYRA
0
50 KM
100 KM

319–320) was conducted by violence, not diplomacy. After the assault on Daulis and its probable sack,[53] the rest of the Phocians *terrore magis quam armis in potestatem venerunt* (Livy 32.18.9). We have seen Flamininus use this tactic before, in Thessaly. The campaign culminated in the siege and sack of Elateia (Livy 32.24.6–7).

Thus, Flamininus' decision to turn south from Thessaly into Central Greece—an *ad hoc* decision, made only when the siege of Atrax seemed hopeless (Livy 32.18.1–3)— was determined by considerations of supply, not politics. It was not part of a previously-conceived grand design to win over Philip's Greek allies. It resulted in a campaign of "pacification" against the Phocians which was conducted through the strategy of the horrible example. Flamininus may have been personally charming to certain envoys from Greek states (Plut. *Flam.* 5.4–6), but his use of atrocity was just like that of Galba; indeed, this tactic seems typical of Roman war-making (cf. Pol. 3.76.2, and esp. 10.15.4), and we should assume that both P. Galba and T. Flamininus had received similar training concerning it during their early military service.

F. Achaea

While Flamininus was besieging Elateia (fall, 198), he was informed that the political situation in Achaea had changed in favour of Rome (Livy 32.19.1–2). Since the Roman, Rhodian, and Attalid fleets were preparing to attack Corinth and its Macedonian garrison (Livy 32.19.3), the time seemed right for a diplomatic overture to the neighboring Achaean League, which had hitherto remained *de facto* neutral in the war. The consul ordered his brother Lucius, the commander of the Roman fleet, to offer the Achaeans Corinth in exchange for joining the Roman cause (Livy 32.19.4). All sides (including the Macedonians) then presented their positions to an Achaean audience at Sicyon (*ibid.*).

Controversy over the proper course the League was to take in the war had been growing in Achaea (Livy 32.20.3). Now, following the Sicyon conference, a violent two-day debate occurred in the Achaean assembly. At the end of it, when—by a bare and reluctant majority vote of the *demiurgi*—a motion supporting the Roman alliance was put to the assembly, the men from Dyme and Megalopolis, along with many Argives, simply walked out in anger (Livy 32.22.8–9). These cities all had close ties with Philip (for instance, he had ransomed the people of Dyme after Galba had sold them into slavery following the sack of the town in 208—Livy 32.22.10), and Megalopolis and Argos were the two most important cities in the League. A reduced Achaean assembly then passed the Roman

[53]The circumstances in which the town fell would suggest a sack: the Roman soldiery broke into the town with men from Daulis who had just made an abortive sally. It must have been a slaughter (Livy 32.18.8).

alliance; Argos later dropped out of the League altogether, enthusiastically accepting a Macedonian garrison (Livy 32.25.2 ff.).[54]

The Achaean League had remained neutral in the war, and clearly there was much pro-Macedonian sentiment in the various towns. Why, then, did the Achaeans now abandon their alliance with Macedon, which had endured for a quarter of a century?[55]

Livy presents the factors causing serious division among the Achaeans (32.19.6): not only fear of the Roman army (. . . *horrebant Romana arma* . . .), and fear of Nabis of Sparta, but also the previous close relations with Macedon, combined with disgust at Philip's own recent atrocities, and fear of him should he be victorious over Rome.

Livy also transmits the speech of the *strategos* Aristaenus to the Achaean assembly (32.21). The greater part of the speech consists of a playing on the fears of the Achaeans concerning Roman attacks such as those suffered in the First Macedonian War should the League side with Philip, or even remain neutral (or rather, Aristaenus argues that it is impossible to remain neutral).[56] Only at the very end of the speech is there a brief remark on the advantage of freeing the League from the domination of Philip by joining the Romans (Livy 32.21.36); then Aristaenus returns again to his main point: . . . *hos* [*Romanos*] *si socios aspernamini, vix mentis sanae estis; sed aut socios aut hostes habeatis oportet* (Livy 32.21.37)—there is no middle ground, and the consequences of rejecting the Roman offer of friendship are clear.[57]

Similarly, Livy gives us the argument used on those who were still reluctant to agree to the Roman alliance following Aristaenus' speech: they should not destroy the entire Achaean people (Livy 32.22.6).

The trend in Livy's account is that what motivated the Achaeans to ally themselves with Rome in 198 was mostly fear. The fear motif definitely comes from Polybius (cf. Pol. 18.13.8). Possibly he overemphasized it, since the Achaean desertion of Macedon in 198 was controversial (and especially Aristaenus' role—at 18.13.8–10 Polybius defends him against the charge of treason to Achaea). Specifically, it is hard to believe that the Roman offer of Corinth played absolutely no part in the Achaean decision. At the end of the year, the Achaeans were to demand

[54]Cf. Aymard 83–102; J. Deininger, *Der politische Widerstand gegen Rom in Griechenland (217–86 v. Chr.)* (Berlin 1971) 42–46.

[55]On the origin of this alliance, cf. now E. S. Gruen, "Aratus and the Achaean Alliance with Macedon," *Historia* 21 (1972) 609–625.

[56]There is a long comparison of the weakness of Philip with the power of Rome (Livy 32.21.7–20; 25–32); the image of sacked cities is constantly evoked (32.21.7; 15; 17; 26–28; 32); as for neutrality, the Roman offer must be either accepted or rejected, and rejection is dangerous (32.21.33–34).

[57]Cf. Aymard 93—"Au total, donc, un discours uniquement destiné à effrayer et à terroriser."

Corinth from Philip at the Nicaea conference (Pol. 18.2.5; Livy 32.33.7), and their envoy to Rome in winter 198/197 seems to have demanded it too (Pol. 18.11.4; cf. 10.11; Livy 32.37.3).

But there is little reason to believe that Livy (based on Polybius) has distorted the basic reason for the Achaean decision. Polybius depicts Aristaenus as a sincere man who simply felt that Achaea was too weak to face Rome (Pol. 24.12; cf. 24.13.8). The fact is that this was true. The fleet of L. Flamininus lay at Cenchreae, displaying the spoils of Euboea, an object lesson to the Achaean assembly (Livy 32.21.7; cf. 41.24.13). The Achaeans knew what Galba could do (App. *Mac.* 7), and that the Flaminini had shown themselves to be no different from Galba (Paus. 7.8.1). That, even so, Aristaenus' arguments barely carried the day is a testimony to the strength of pro-Macedonian sentiment within the League (cf. Livy 41.24.14).

From the Roman side, it is important to note that T. Flamininus never gave the Achaean matter his personal attention. He sanctioned his brother's attempt to detach Achaea from the Hellenic Symmachy of Macedon and *de facto* neutrality, apparently because he thought (or agreed) that the Achaeans would be of some help to Lucius in the assault on Corinth (cf. Livy 32.19.3–4). This may remind us of Galba's policy of using diplomacy with neutrals who were valuable strategically (cf. above, 126–127). But the consul himself remained intent on affairs in Phocis, and on conducting the siege of Elateia, which was to end in a traditional plundering of the town (Livy 32.24.7).

Upholders of a more traditional view of Flamininus than the one presented in this paper might argue that the Achaean fear of Rome was unjustified, because the Romans would not have risked attacking Achaea if the League refused the alliance, and thus making further diplomatic success with the Greeks impossible.[58] However, I think that it is clear that Flamininus in 198 considered diplomacy with the Greeks no more than a side-show to the war with Philip.

In this regard, the diplomacy of L. Flamininus towards the Acarnanian League in the spring of 197 is instructive. Lucius was attempting to detach the Acarnanians also from the Hellenic Symmachy and bring them into the war on the side of Rome (success in Achaea may have inspired him). A rump assembly was convened at Leucas, the Acarnanian capital, and it agreed to the Roman alliance (Livy 33.16.1–3). But later a full assembly rescinded the alliance, voting to abide by Philip and to reject the Roman offer of friendship (Livy 33.16.11). Lucius' reaction was first to try to intimidate the Acarnanians (Livy 33.17.3), and, when

[58]Badian, "Philhellenism" 40; cf. Aymard 9.

that failed, to besiege Leucas; he eventually took it by storm (Livy 33.17.5–14).[59]

The actions of L. Flamininus in the spring of 197, in a situation quite similar to that in Achaea in the autumn of 198, would suggest that the Achaeans were indeed right to worry about the Roman reaction to their decision. To be sure, in the case of Achaea—unlike the Acarnanian affair —no great man's personal *dignitas* was involved in refusal. The consul was busy at Elateia; his brother sent a junior officer to speak for the Romans at Sicyon.[60] But Aristaenus was surely right to point out that once the Roman offer of friendship had been made, it had to be either overtly accepted or overtly rejected, and that overt rejection could easily be construed as a hostile act—with dire consequences for the Achaeans.

To summarize, the decision of T. Flamininus to attempt to bring the Achaean League into the war against Philip should not be seen as the culmination of a conscious and concerted diplomatic offensive against Philip's Greek allies (in fact, there had been none), but rather as an *ad hoc* response to a situation presented to Flamininus while he himself was intent on the reduction of Phocis. The major factor (though not the only factor) involved in the violent debate in Achaea over the proposed Roman alliance was fear of Roman terror tactics—which Flamininus had shown himself to be perfectly comfortable in using. Further, if the Achaeans *felt* "the knife was at their throats,"[61] the actions of L. Flamininus in regard to the recalcitrant Acarnanians in the spring of 197 might well indicate that the Achaeans actually had something to worry about. One final point is worth reiterating: the diplomatic overture to Achaea was not a great break in the traditional Roman strategy against Philip. Diplomacy as an adjunct to military operations had been an integral part of the strategy of P. Galba in 200 and 199, and the overture to Achaea was undertaken in the same spirit.

G. Final Operations

The Romans gained little but the Achaean alliance from their fall campaign in the Peloponnese. The assault of L. Flamininus on Corinth failed because of the courage of the Macedonian garrison, the timely arrival of Philip's general Philocles, and the fact that the garrison had the complete support of the civilian population of Corinth (Livy 32.23.4 ff.— another example of the adverse effects of Roman terrorism?). After this,

[59]Cf. Oost (above, n. 44) 50–51; Deininger (above, n. 54) 47–49.

[60]L. Calpurnius (Livy 32.19.11); this is the only reference we have to this man (*MRR* 1.331).

[61]Holleaux, *CAH* 8.170–171.

Argos enthusiastically went over to the Macedonians (Livy 32.25.2 ff.). The two major cities of the Peloponnese were now in Philip's hands; this went some way towards balancing the Roman successes earlier in the year.

Meanwhile, T. Flamininus finished off his Greek campaign of 198 by sacking Elateia (Livy 32.24.6–7).

IV. CONCLUSION

I have sought to present a picture of T. Quinctius Flamininus and the campaign of 198 B.C. which is significantly different from the one generally accepted. Flamininus seems to have been a young noble with limited experience and qualifications (as far as we know), who was propelled to the consulate by his excellent political connections (few of which we know), and who owed his command in Greece to luck (the lot). Once in Greece, Flamininus' methods and strategy seem to have been quite similar to those of his predecessor P. Galba (this might be expected, once it is hypothesized that Flamininus had no claim to special diplomatic or military insight). The "Aous Declaration" was meant mainly to humble Philip V, to make him overtly acknowledge the political dominance of Rome over Macedon. Flamininus' turn to the southeast after his victory over Philip on the Aous was not a turning away from seeking military victory to seeking diplomatic gains among the Greeks. Rather, it too was aimed at Philip, to approach Pella from Thessaly rather than from the west along the mountain route of Galba, and it was based on considerations of supply, not diplomacy—specifically on the lack of supplies along the Galba route and on the fact that the fall of Gomphi opened up a new (southern) supply route. Moreover, throughout the fighting in Thessaly and Phocis (again, a campaign in which the problem of supplies was important), Flamininus pursued approximately the same (often brutal) policy towards the Greek allies of Philip as Galba had, although—again like Galba—Flamininus was not averse to diplomatic overtures to strategically valuable neutrals.[62]

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, BERKELEY

[62]I should like to thank Prof. E. S. Gruen for the unstinting help he has given this paper, and Prof. E. Badian and the anonymous reviewer for their own salutary criticisms. The responsibility for the views expressed is, of course, my own.